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I. INTRODUCTION
Joseph Carens began writing about the ethics of immigration in the 1980s, and, if not 
the first, he was certainly one of the first political philosophers to ask critical questions 
about the state’s right to exclude would-be migrants. The story goes – and I’m sure it 
is true – that his first attempts to have his work published were unsuccessful, with 
journals rejecting his papers. I had a similar experience in the 1990s, when my first paper 
questioning the right to exclude was returned by a journal editor without sending it to 
referees – he simply did not see it as a subject worthy of philosophical discussion. 
He held what Carens describes as the ‘Conventional View’ – the presumption that states 
have the right to discretionary control over who crosses their borders – and he could 
not imagine that this view could be open to rational criticism. The situation has clearly 
changed since those days and a there is a substantial and still growing scholarship on 
the ethics of immigration, and another generation of scholars have picked up the argu-
ments and taken them to more and more interesting levels. And now we have Carens’ 
eagerly awaited book, which draws his work together into one sustained and coherent 
argument.
II. THE ETHICS OF IMMIGRATION
The Ethics of Immigration does not disappoint. The breadth and depth of its vision is 
extraordinary and it will shape the debate for many years to come as an indispensable 
text. It also gives those of us who teach the ethics of migration in our courses the chance 
to introduce our students to that vision in its entirety, instead of guiding them to 
glimpses of it in journal articles and book chapters. However, my task here is not only 
to praise Carens and his book, but to raise challenges so that we continue the dialogue 
he began in the 1980s. The fact remains that I have always been aware of a difference 
between Carens’ approach to the question of the ethics of immigration and my own, 
and it turns out to be an important one because it is central to the book’s very structure. 
That difference is whether we as theorists can argue directly for open borders, or 
whether we need to work our way to that conclusion by tackling other questions of 
social and political justice first, and getting there only after having tackled those ques-
tions. Despite the fact that we agree on the ultimate destination, I take the first route, 
while Carens’ takes the second.
What that means is that I take the question of membership to be fundamental to 
all other questions of social and political justice, and therefore hold that any theoretical 
approach to questions of social justice that takes place within the confines of a 
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 nation-state that has not first addressed the ethics of membership must be incomplete 
and incoherent. Carens believes that there are questions of social and political justice 
that can be addressed and answered within the confines of a nation-state prior to asking 
the fundamental question about the ethics of membership. His book follows that pat-
tern, with the first ten chapters addressing the ethical dimensions of specific issues, such 
as the status of temporary workers, irregular migrants and refugees, and the last three 
arguing for the ethics of open borders. The first ten chapters do not rest on any argu-
ments for open borders, and indeed Carens says that in those chapters he is working 
within the framework of the Conventional View, and thus with the presumption that 
states have the right to discretionary control over who crosses their borders. In the last 
three chapters he argues that this Conventional View is wrong, but argues that it is pos-
sible to accept all of his arguments in the first ten chapters without abandoning it. Also, 
while the philosophical arguments in the first part are “[…] almost entirely independent 
from the arguments about free movement” in the second part of the book, the argu-
ments in both parts are “compatible” with each other (12). However, his position is 
more complex than may appear from this, in that while he argues that most of the 
answers to the questions in the first part, if thought through correctly, will be compat-
ible with an open-borders position (the correct answer to the fundamental question of 
membership), some of them will not be. I will return to this complexity in the relation-
ship between the two parts of the book below.
Carens explains why he takes this approach. He is, he says, doing political theory 
from the ground up. By this he means he is not working from any specific theoretical 
framework about justice or democracy or human rights, but instead is drawing on widely 
shared democratic ideas and principles that he finds in the major liberal democracies in 
the world today. He is relying on an “overlapping consensus” about what democracy 
requires (9), a consensus that includes political theorists and ordinary democratic citi-
zens. What emerges from this consensus is a set of democratic principles which all these 
people agree upon: 
[…] the broad moral commitments that underlie and justify contemporary political insti-
tutions and policies throughout North America and Europe – things like the ideas that 
all human beings are of equal moral worth, that disagreements should normally be 
resolved through the principle of majority rule, that we have a duty to respect the rights 
and freedom of individuals, that legitimate government depends upon the consent of the 
governed, that all citizens should be equal under the law, that coercion should only be 
exercised in accordance with the rule of law, that people should not be subject to dis-
crimination on the basis of characteristics like race, religion or gender, that we should 
respect norms like fairness and reciprocity in our policies, and so on (2). 
The important point is that these principles morally constrain state sovereignty and 
democratic self-determination (7) such that a liberal democratic state cannot have any 
immigration rules it likes. What emerges from this consensus is a “[…] general account 
of how democrats should think about immigration” (10).
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An important part of this approach, however, is to work within the Conventional 
View for as long as possible, because it is part of the overlapping consensus – very few 
political theorists accept an open-borders position, and even fewer politicians or citizens 
of liberal democratic states. There is a pragmatic element to this approach: “[…] if I am 
to have any hope of persuading people of the merits of my views on the other issues 
that I discuss […], I must not tie those arguments to the case for open borders” (11). 
But Carens insists this is not only pragmatism – it is “[…] a principled commitment to 
a certain kind of dialogue” (11). Democratic deliberation as a practice involves adopting 
moral views that are widely shared in the democratic community, even when we as 
participants may not agree with those specific views. Otherwise democratic dialogue 
could not take place. This means he takes a dialectical approach in the first part of the 
book, and a more direct approach in the second. Nevertheless, as we have seen, although 
the two sets of arguments are almost entirely independent, they are compatible with each 
other. Those who wish to stop the journey at the end of chapter 10 can do so with the 
sense that they have reached a coherent ending, while those who wish to stay for the 
rest of the ride can do so without feeling they have had to change trains.
Carens elaborates on this aspect of philosophical method in an Appendix, which 
shows the importance of the relationship between the two parts of books, and which, 
to an extent, justifies my focus on this comparatively narrow aspect of it. There, he 
makes it clear that all debate requires presuppositions to begin, even though those 
presuppositions can be questioned at a later stage. We cannot question everything at 
once. To illustrate this, he draws a continuum between what he calls the Just World 
presupposition, which takes very little as morally given (301), and the Real World 
presupposition, which takes the world more or less as we find it, morally and institu-
tionally (303). Carens believes he is exploring a third way, which he describes as the 
Democratic Principles presupposition (306). All that is presupposed here is a commit-
ment to democratic principles – we can address issues of migration by thinking 
through what justice requires in terms of the principles we find in the contemporary 
democratic tradition.
III. THE JUST WORLD
The question of where we start the argument, what presuppositions we hold and which 
we question, is of course very complex, and Carens’ method here is attractive in that it 
enables us to avoid the need to establish controversial starting points – we can begin 
with some degree of consensus. As he points out, the Just World presupposition – 
which most closely captures my own approach – forces us to address some fundamen-
tal theoretical issues that require a wider moral theory or theories, such as a theory of 
human rights. If we take Carens’ approach we can take human rights as we find them 
in liberal democratic theory and practice and discuss the ethics of immigration in that 
context. If we take my approach, as I am all too aware, we need to more or less start 
again – as David Miller has pointed out to me, the fundamental difference between his 
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position and mine is not particularly our view about the ethics of immigration, but our 
theories of human rights.
That being said, the Just World presupposition, as I understand it, is built upon a 
commitment to moral equality, the equal moral worth of all human beings, and this 
commitment does not appear out of nowhere – it is already here, embodied in the 
democratic principles that Carens makes central to his work. Indeed, this commitment, 
I have argued elsewhere, is one of the defining features of any theory we can describe 
as liberal (Wellman and Cole 2011, 177-178). My claim is that if we recognize the force 
of the principle of moral equality, we can see that it leads us directly to open borders, 
because it is only in that political order that the moral equality of humanity is fully real-
ized.
This claim needs clarifying in two senses because it is easily misunderstood. The 
first is that I do not argue that it is only under a regime of freedom of international 
movement that moral equality is fully realized in all dimensions – only that it is fully real-
ized with respect to the right to move. There are many other aspects of moral equality 
that need addressing, and a world in which moral equality is fully realized in all its 
dimensions – not just with respect to movement – would be very different to the world 
that we live I today. I have never argued that open borders are the answer to every issue 
of social and global justice. The second is that when I say that the principle of moral 
equality leads us directly to the need for freedom of international movement, I do not 
mean that the journey from the one to the other is either a speedy one or a straightfor-
ward one. All I mean is that freedom of international movement is the inevitable desti-
nation of the argument – it may take us a long time to get there and require much 
argument in between. Natalie Brender certainly thinks I place too much weight on the 
principle of moral equality and its role in liberal political theory: “Even if the principle 
of equality is at the center of a liberal vision of politics, is it plausible to consider this 
commitment the only concern informing the practices and institutions of liberal demo-
cratic states?” (2003, 192). She concludes: 
[...] the state exists for many functions other than the dubious ones of national com-
munity. Its administrative functions are by their very nature focused largely on the 
welfare of its members rather than of outsiders. A liberal state will have as one of its 
central commitments the moral principle of equality, but [...] that cannot be its only 
commitment. If it is to fulfill the functions we expect a state to fulfill, it must also be 
committed to tending to the political, social and economic welfare of its members 
(2003, 193).
This criticism certainly gets to the point and it is clearly a mistake to represent liberal 
theory as having only one value, that of equality. It consists of a family of values, such 
as pluralism, welfare, social justice, liberty, neutrality, democracy, public order, limited 
government, private property and others too. There is a wide variety of liberal theories 
shaped by the weight and order and interpretation they place on these values. Egalitar-
ian liberal theory places moral equality near, if not at, the centre, but still, as Brender 
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observes, there must be other values in play. Moral equality, however, has a centrally 
important role to play, a role Carens recognizes when he observes: “It is so funda-
mental that it is probably not possible to find a moral view within the liberal tradition 
that is presented as incompatible with the principle of moral equality” (2014). For me, 
that role is in partially to provide a conception of what it is to be a human being and 
partly to provide a limit to the extent to which liberal states can pursue other particu-
lar values, especially non-liberal ones such as national security (I mean non-liberal 
rather than illiberal in the sense that national security is not a distinctively liberal 
value). In relation to the latter task, the question is to what extent the state can pursue 
national security without undermining the moral equality of persons to an unaccept-
able degree (members and non-members, of course). This interplay or dialectic 
between the value of moral equality and other values is at the heart of liberal theory 
and practice – for a liberal state, policy questions must always have this ethical dimen-
sion to them. 
This does entail giving the value of moral equality a central and privileged position 
in liberal theory and practice, but it is not to say that it can never be compromised at 
all in the pursuit of other values. What it does mean is that there will always be a pre-
sumption in favour of moral equality and a dialogue or dialectic to determine the extent 
to which equality can be compromised for the sake of other goods. Brender is correct 
that immigration controls enable liberal states to achieve other goods and values, but 
the ethical question is whether, in pursuing those goals through the exercise of 
 immigration controls, liberal states have compromised the principle of moral quality to 
an unacceptable degree.
And so, while I do believe that the principle of moral equality gets us directly to 
freedom of international movement, I mean ‘directly’ here to mean that it is the inevi-
table destination of the dialectic, not that there is no argument to be had in between. 
We will get to that destination through a complex process in which we draw out the 
contradictions and arbitrary limitations placed upon the force of this particular demo-
cratic principle when we measure other liberal values and practices against it, and work 
out how to make those values and practices compatible with it. For me, the commitment 
to moral equality drives the argument to a specific ethical conclusion, but the point is 
that this commitment is embodied in liberal democratic theory and practice from the 
beginning. What we are doing in our dialectical argument is digging out contradictions 
and working them through to the next step. When we have fully worked them through 
we will end up at a specific destination, but this is a long and complex process. Indeed, 
it may well entail a book at least as long as Carens’ Ethics of Immigration, with much the 
same arguments and much the same set of chapters.
IV. SOCIAL MEMBERSHIP
So what precisely is the disagreement here? If there is one, it is that for me the destina-
tion of the argument is already contained in the starting premises (indeed, logically, it 
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must be there somewhere). It may take a great deal of complex argument to reveal it, 
but it must be there. And this means that the Conventional View Carens takes as a 
presumption in the first part of the book must be mistaken. Carens, of course, agrees 
that it is mistaken given his overall view, but the point is that the dialectic Carens is 
engaged in during that first part cannot stop at the end of chapter 10 and a distinct set 
of philosophical arguments begin. Rather, there is a continuous dialectic running through 
the whole text that drives us through the border between chapters 10 and 11 and on to 
the end. Those passengers who may want to get off at the end of chapter 10 should 
find that they are unable to do so.
Carens replies to this criticism in his piece on Crooked Timber (2014). There are 
two aspects to this reply. First, the ideal of moral equality, while fundamental, is 
highly abstract, and there is very little agreement about what it means. “So, by itself, 
the abstract principle of moral equality does not take us very far in thinking about 
the legitimacy of alternative institutions and policies” (2014). Secondly, there is a 
theory of social membership that does the work in the first part of the book, and 
this theory stands alone in the sense that it does not entail any of the content of the 
second part. For Carens, social membership – the fact that one resides in a society 
as a member – is morally prior to citizenship. Therefore living within the territorial 
boundaries of a state makes one a member of society, and this social membership 
gives rise to moral claims in relation to that political society which strengthen over 
time. “The theory of social membership [...] provides a foundation for moral claims 
to legal rights. This foundation is an alternative to citizenship and is more fundamen-
tal than citizenship because it is actually the basis for the moral claims of citizens to 
many legal rights” (160-161). Carens’ strategy here is to show that as citizenship rests 
on social membership, a person who is resident for a certain period of time has a 
strengthening entitlement to the bundle of rights that make up citizenship. These, 
however, will be membership-specific rights, not universal human rights, and this 
distinction remains crucially important even if we move on to an open-borders posi-
tion (291). Social membership will still be important in a world of open borders. I 
have two reflections on this reply. First, it is true that the idea of moral equality is 
highly complex and that there is very little agreement on its content in liberal theory. 
However, Carens seems to assume that the version of the principle that underlies 
our common arguments for open borders is especially abstract and complex and 
controversial. In fact, the principle of moral equality at work here is relatively simple, 
and so relatively uncontroversial – it is the conclusion of the argument that is con-
troversial, not the ideal of moral equality appealed to therein. The ideal of moral 
equality does not have to be particularly abstract and complex in order to challenge 
the right of states to exclude – the comparatively theoretical ‘thin’ concept will do 
the job. If all human beings are held to be morally equal in a ‘thin’ sense of equality, 
exclusion from membership still emerges as highly problematic. By ‘thin’ here I mean 
a concept of moral equality that simply points to the need for equal moral weight to 
be attached to all human beings when it comes to important moral issues – the con-
cept has very little content apart from equal treatment. This contrasts to a ‘thick’ 
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approach, which argues that only a rich set of social and political rights can fill the 
content of equality. Interestingly, both theorists on the libertarian right and the lib-
eral/socialist left can arrive at the same place when it comes to freedom of move-
ment, and I believe this is possible precisely because the concept of equality under-
pinning the argument is a theoretically ‘thin’ one that the libertarian right can accept 
without difficulty.
In fact, the ideal of moral equality that underpins Carens’ arguments about social 
membership is much more ‘thick’ than the one that underpins arguments for freedom 
of international movement, as it entails a commitment to the relatively rich set of social 
and political rights that make up citizenship of a liberal democratic state. If that is right, 
then the ideal of moral equality that underpins the first part of the book is far more 
complex and controversial than the ideal that underpins the arguments in the second, 
in which case the arguments are the wrong way round. We should begin with the rela-
tively thin and uncontroversial sense of moral equality that undermines exclusion from 
membership as such, and then build a more complex picture of moral equality around 
possession of specific rights, duties, access to resources and so on, which establishes the 
specific argument from social membership. First, we argue that all have the right to 
enter; second, we argue that certain of those who have entered have the right to the full 
set of rights attached to social membership. Tackling the questions in the order Carens 
uses leads to some of the complexities between the two parts of the book I noted above, 
that not all the principles Carens identifies in the first part of the book are compatible 
with the second. The fact that most of the principles Carens establishes in that first part 
are compatible with the second part but some are not indicates that the treatment of 
those latter questions do not fully work through the implications of the principle of 
moral equality.
Setting aside the question of method I explore above, I should emphasize the 
extent to which I am in agreement with the arguments in the book about social mem-
bership and access to the rights of citizenship, and the arguments concerning the immo-
rality of immigration controls. It is a major contribution to the debate that answers many 
fundamental questions. Most importantly, it answers a question that has always troubled 
me, and, ironically perhaps given what I have said here, it does so in the first part of 
the book. There are two major challenges facing political theorists who advocate open 
borders. The first is to establish why a liberal democratic state has no moral right to 
exclude anybody from crossing its borders. The second is to recognize that once we 
have done this there is still the need to distinguish between members and non-members, 
in that not everyone who crosses the borders automatically becomes a member. What 
can make a new location ‘home’? This is a key aspect for the discussion of migration 
and membership of political community that can be neglected. There must be a distinc-
tion between just passing through and being at home, such that merely being within the 
geographical space is not sufficient. To be a member is to be settled, which is to be 
present in a particular way. Membership is to have some kind of stake within that place, 
but this stake is something one can take up voluntarily, rather than something given to 
some but withheld from others. 
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IV. CONCLUSION
The strength of Carens’ contribution is that he answers both questions fully. The 
second part of the book explains why liberal democratic states have no right to 
exclude, and the first part explains the distinction between members and ‘visitors’. 
However, while Carens may be the first theorist to give such a full answer to this 
second and crucial question, I still have some reservations about his answer. For him, 
what grounds membership is residence and length of stay. They act as proxies for 
other more complex criteria of social membership that are objective and easy to mea-
sure (165); neverthekess, it is the length of time a person lives in a society that grounds 
the right to citizenship through that social membership. My view is that membership 
is not grounded in the past, but in the future, in one’s future intentions and undertak-
ings. Membership is an undertaking voluntarily taken up. Civic republicanism provides 
a historical tradition here, with the idea of civic responsibility being a set of obligations 
to the political community – the focus is on duties rather than rights, and one can 
take up the duties of citizenship as soon as one arrives. While this implies that any-
body who remains within the territory for a certain period of time is obliged to take on 
membership (one cannot remain a ‘visitor’ and refuse to take up those duties beyond 
a certain time), it does not imply that only someone who has been within the territory 
for a certain time can become a member. If membership is voluntarily taken up and 
that taking-up is the acceptance of a set of duties, then it can be taken immediately 
upon arrival within the territory. 
This is, of course, a minor difference. This is a book I shall be reading for many 
months, perhaps years, in order to fully grasp its arguments, and my respect and admi-
ration for Joseph Carens can only grow with every reading.
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